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RESUMEN: 
En este trabajo se ha realizado un análisis financiero de tres importantes empresas del 
sector de los servicios públicos en España: Iberdrola, Acciona y Abengoa. Se ha 
considerado la diferente situación de las mismas y se ha realizado una comparación 
de las distintas métricas de las empresas con las medias del sector, para ver mejor 
cuál es la situación de dichos negocios en el panorama general. El periodo analizado 
va desde 2011 hasta 2015, ya que son las cuentas más recientes disponibles en el 
momento de realizar el trabajo. 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper is the product of a financial statement analysis, focusing on the analysis of 
the profitability, liquidity and solvency, of three major companies within the Spanish 
utilities industry: Iberdrola, Acciona and Abengoa. The different situation of these 3 
corporations have been considered and a comparison between these enterprises key 
performance indicators and the industry averages has been made in order to better 
identify the general scene within the sector. The analyzed period comprehends 
between the years 2011 and 2015, since this was the most recent data in the moment 
this work was written. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this project is to make a financial statement analysis of three major Spanish 
enterprises within the energetic and infrastructures industry, namely Abengoa SA, 
Acciona SA and Iberdrola SA. We will use different analytical techniques in order to 
determine which has been, which is and which will (presumably) be their situation in 
the next few years. We will try to draw some useful conclusions and explain why their 
development through the years has been in that particular way. 
We chose these three enterprises as they are good examples of different scenarios: 
first of all, we have a giant such as Iberdrola, which is one of the big utilities companies 
in the international scene, the second group of electric energy production in Spain and 
one of the worldwide leaders in the wind energy industry. In second place we will talk 
about Acciona, which is a medium-sized company in the industry. Finally, we will 
consider the remarkable case of Abengoa, which went from one of the biggest Spanish 
companies to having serious problems to survive and being currently in pre-state of 
insolvency. It is important to note that in this project we will deal with the parent 
companies as representatives of their groups, and we will take some considerations in 
the analytical process because of this.  
To accomplish this analysis, we will study the business model of each of the 
companies and assess their profitability, liquidity and solvency separately. After that, 
we will perform a comparative analysis between these corporations themselves and 
compared to the industry averages, to better grasp the real situation. Once we have 
carefully analyzed the information about the past, we will be in a good situation to make 
some predictions about the future opportunities and threats of these businesses.  
The project will be structured in six different sections, each one with a different 
purpose: first of all we find this introduction, in which we want to lay out briefly the 
content of the whole document and the main objectives of it. Secondly, we will present 
the industry and the chosen companies, so that we have some background for the 
analysis. We will cover the financial situation of the industry in Spain, and we will 
describe the companies and their business models. The third part will be the analytical 
process carried out to establish the situation of the firms and explain the reasons why 
they are where they are today. In the fourth section we will compare these three 
companies among themselves and the industry averages. Finally, in the fifth part we 
will draw some conclusions from the analysis we have previously performed. The sixth 
and final section will be the bibliography used for the project. 
It is important to note that the paper will be delivered together with a CD-ROM in 
which extra information, necessary for the analysis, will be presented. This includes 






















































PRESENTATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND COMPANIES 
2.1 THE INDUSTRY 
2.1.1 Utilities industry 
According to Market Line (2016), this industry comprehends companies whose 
business is providing water, gas and power. These kind of companies have 
experimented a moderate increase during the last few years, and their growth is 
predicted to continue in the 3% level. Within the sector, the most profitable segment 
was electricity, with total revenues equivalent to 75.6% of the industry value. Water 
represents 12.2% and gas the remaining 12.1% of the industry. In Europe Spain 
represents 6.5% of the total value of the industry, with the leaders being Germany, UK 
and France, in that order. 
  
 
Figure 2.1. Porter’s five forces 
Source: Market Line (2016) 
If we analyze Porter’s five forces in the industry following Market Line report, we 
realize buyer power is low because utilities are essential for the vast majority of people, 
and the big amount of potential customers make this parameter less important.  
Although many of these companies are an example of vertical integration, some of 
them (ie water companies) outsource some engineering services. This services are 
rendered through very strict lump-sum contracts that give these companies big power 
because third parties may incur in fines if they break the agreement. All this constitutes 
a moderate supplier power.   
Legislation in the industry is very strict and the necessary infrastructure to operate in 
it is expensive and requires a capital-intensive approach. However, loyalty in the 
industry is low due to the low change costs for final customers and the undifferentiated 
nature of the product that is offered. These facts make the probability of new entrants 
moderated. 
Substitutes of the industry as a whole are difficult to find, but in here self-sufficiency 
and water gathering techniques may be included. However, the importance of these is 




very low since the amount of people who have access to these methods is small and 
the inconvenience of them is high in the majority of cases. 
As the product offered is a commodity and then the main option to compete is 
bettering the price offered by your rival, additionally to the fact that the number of 
enterprises is low and they are big and powerful, we can deduct that the degree of 
rivalry is high within the industry.  
2.1.2 Structure of the industry 
In this section we will explain the functioning of the electric power industry, given this is 
the most important business line of the analyzed companies. Their business, as we will 
see later, is not exclusively related to this scope, but we would not be able to explain 
properly all the activities in which they are involved, so we will focus on the most 
important portion. 
 
Figure 2.2: Utilities business model 
Source: Strategy + Business (July 2015) 
Generally speaking, to provide households with electric power we will need to take 
four basic steps: 
- Generation of the electric power in different kinds of plants. 
- Transport or transmission of the electric power through the transport network. 
- Distribution from the network to the consumption points. 
- Commercialization of the power depending on the needs of the final customer. 
Years ago, the industry in Spain used to be an oligopoly, with 5 big corporations 
controlling all the value chain of the business, leaving customers without any choice. 
From 1997, a timid liberalization process of the sector is initiated, affecting production 
and commercialization. Transport and distribution on the other hand, keep being a 
natural monopoly, and require a special supervision from public authorities.  
Nowadays, more than 40 companies are dedicated to the commercialization of electric 
power in Spain. We can choose which company in charge of distributing the energy we 
consume, but we cannot choose who produced it (Aura Energía, 2015). 
We find out that electricity is just like any other merchandise: there are people who 
produce it, then sell it to wholesalers, who at the same time resale it to retailers, who 
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are in charge of delivering it to the final customer. Nowadays, the traditional business 
model in the industry, in which the company owned and conducted every vital business 
function is being threatened by specialists who control just small segments of the value 
chain. 
As we will see with more detail later, both Acciona and Iberdrola are present in 
several steps of the process, being in a situation of vertical integration. Abengoa 
however, is dedicated to the production phase of the process, or more concretely, to 
building the necessary infrastructure for companies which are in charge of producing 
electric power. 
2.2 THE COMPANIES: ACTIVITIES AND BUSINESS MODELS 
2.2.1. Iberdrola, S.A.        
The corporation was born in 1992 with the merger of Hidroeléctrica Española and 
Iberduero. In 1955 appears in Scotland South of Scotland Electricity Board, which will 
become Scottish Power in 1990. Two years later, this company merges with 
Hidroeléctrica Española and Iberduera to become what we know today as Iberdrola. In 
the last few years of the 20th century, the company initiates the expansion in Latin 
America. In the US, Iberdrola operates as Avangrid, the result of the merger between 
Iberdrola USA y UIL Holdings. From 2001, the group starts working with renewable 
energy and from 2006 continues its international expansion, becoming stronger in 
several locations in America and Europe (García Adán y Diego Martín, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.3: Map of Iberdrola operations and sources of energy. 
Source: Iberdrola.com (2016) 
In 2015, according to its Annual Accounts, the company had a net turnover of 
€1581m, with a net benefit of €117m, contrasting with the benefit of €358m in the 
previous year. The worsening of the results, according to the company, is due to the 
new administration model together with the fact that subsidiaries had paid €449m in 
dividends this year in contrast to the €814m paid last year. This is due to some 
organizational changes carried out during these last periods. 




Iberdrola S.A., according to the fourth article of its Articles of Association, has as its 
corporate purpose: 
 The realization of all kind of activities, works and services related to the 
production, transport, distribution and commercialization of electric power 
and it derivatives. It includes the supply of raw materials and infrastructures, 
engineering, telecommunications and Internet services related with this 
scope. It also covers all kind of services related to water treatment and 
distribution, as well as the provision of urban services. Likewise, the 
corporation is involved in the extraction, warehousing and distribution of gas 
and other related activities. 
 The distribution and commercialization of all kinds of goods and services, 
products, merchandise, computer software, industrial equipment and 
machinery, tools and other accessories. 
 Research, study an planning of investment and business administration 
projects, as well as the promotion, creation and development of industrial, 
commercial and services enterprises 
 The provision of assistance and support services to other enterprises within 
its scope of action (ie. the provision of consulting services to other 
companies of the same industry or other related) 
This activities and business lines will be developed either within the national 
(Spanish) territory or abroad, through the company itself or using its ownership of 
shares in other companies. 
Additionally, Iberdrola provides services to subsidiaries in the group, which basically 
consist on the supply of gas and other IT and support and additional services, not 
directly related to the main operations. Furthermore, the company is in charge of the 
group financing, which is managed in a centralized way. 
Apart from what is stated in the Articles of Association, if we look at the detailed 
revenues and expenses, we realize the society main source of revenue is gas sales to 
subsidiaries, followed by income from holdings in equity and finally some services 
rendered. This clarification is key to understand the posterior analysis of the company. 
In its webpage, the company classifies all these activities in three major business 
lines, namely: 
 Network business: which involves the construction, operation and 
maintenance of electric lines, substations, transformation centers and other 
infrastructures necessary to transport the energy from its place of production 
to the final customer. All this is made following a strict policy of safety, 
accidents control and environmental requirements. 
 Generation and commercial business: it consists on the production of electric 
power through the construction, operation and maintenance of production 
centers and the purchase of this power in wholesale markets. Likewise, it is 
in charge of the retailing of the energy and other complimentary products. Its 
core points are the efficiency and risk minimization, operative excellence, 
competitive supply and excellent customer satisfaction. 
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 Renewable energy business: it covers the generation and commercialization 
of energy from renewable sources such as wind, solar, biomass, etc. The 
company is leading the production of this king of energy in Europe and USA 
and it focuses of the safety of the operations, the operative efficiency of the 
processes and a profitable growth of this market. 
2.2.2. Acciona, S.A.      
Acciona is created in 1997, product of the merger between Cubiertas y Mzov and 
Entrecanales y Távora, two Spanish construction enterprises. Nowadays is a 
conglomeration of companies with distinct business lines, most of them related to 
energy and infrastructures (Acciona, 2017). 
In accordance with its Annual Accounts, Acciona had in 2015 a net  turnover  of 
€246.287m, with a net benefit of €180.55m. These figures represent a decrease in 
revenues (€325.101m in 2014) but a remarkable increase in net benefit (€137.464m), 
mainly due to the good results of the energetic part of the group.  
Acciona S.A. is the parent company of a group of companies which develop their 
activities in different industries of the economic activity, among which we should 
remark: 
 Acciona Energía: which covers the electrical power business in different 
commercial and industrial enterprises along all its stages, from production to 
retailing, going through transport and distribution. 
 Acciona Construcción de Infraestructuras: it includes activities related to 
construction, engineering and transport and hospital licenses. 
 Acciona Agua: related to the construction of desalination plants, water treatment 
plants, as well as the management of the integral water cycle. This includes 
water gathering, treatment and desalination, and its posterior filtering and return 
to the natural environment. It also operates with integral water cycle licenses. 
 Acciona Servicios: which is linked to airport handling, facility services, gathering 
and treatment of waste, logistics and more. 
 Other activities:  This part covers funds management and stock exchange 
intermediation, wine production, the activity of the subsidiary Acciona 
Transmediterránea (shipping company), real estate and other participations. 
The society will be able to participate in all the execution and complementary 
activities of the aforementioned branches, as well as being able to hold shares in 
other companies with an investment purpose. 
In its webpage, the enterprise divides its business into 3 big categories: 
infrastructures (constructions, licenses, water, industrial and services), energy (with 
a special remark on renewable energies) and other businesses as the described 
above. 
Again, if we look in the notes of the Annual Accounts, we observe Acciona does 
not have significant commercial activity on his own, and its income comes 




fundamentally from holdings in equity of subsidiaries and financial investments from 
short-term loans to associated companies. This is important, because we now 
realize its business is to hold equity and make financial investments in the 
subsidiaries of the group. If these subsidiaries do well, Acciona will obtain good 
results. 
2.2.2. Abengoa, S.A.       
 
Abengoa was founded on the 4th of January, 1941 by  Javier Benjumea Puigcerver y 
José Manuel Abaurre Fernández-Pasalagua, and has its headquarters in Campus 
Palmas Altas, Sevilla (Abengoa, 2011). 
The company is an example of a big collapse due to improper growth during the last 
few years, as we will analyze in detail in the next sections. To give some perspective, 
we can compare the year 2012, in which the parent company of the group had a 
revenues figure of almost €1,176m, and a net benefit of €199.6m; with the results of 
the company in 2015, with losses of almost 1,063m. Regarding its share price, the 
company lost 95% of its value in the market from September 2014 to the end of 
November 2015, accumulating losses of 70% in just two sessions at the end of that 
period. 
Currently the company is in a “pre-state of insolvency”, after months of negotiations 
with creditors, having fired thousands of employees and being in the most critical 
situation of its entire history. Through our analysis, we will try to discern which were the 
key factors that led the giant towards the contemporary scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Abengoa share price in the last 5 years. 
Source: Google.com (2017) 
 
According to the third article of its Articles of Association, the corporate purpose of 
Abengoa is a wide range of activities including applied engineering services and 
equipment, providing integral solutions in different industries such as Energy, 
Telecommunications, Water, Transport, Environment and Services. 
Abengoa applies innovative solutions to produce energy form renewable resources 
such as biomass, and solves complex problems such as obtaining potable water from 
sea water. 
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The three basic pillars of the company activities are: 
- Engineering and construction. They classify within this field all the traditional 
engineering activities necessary for water and electricity production. The 
corporation is a specialist in complex turnkey contract projects (this is the  final 
client receives the infrastructure already functioning, even with some additional 
services associated such as maintenance), solar or hybrid solar-gas plants, 
conventional generations and biofuels. Also works on big hydraulic plants and 
desalination plants and transmission lines among others. 
- License-type infrastructures. They have a big portfolio of concessional assets, 
where income is regulated through a long-term sale contract, such as “take or 
pay” of “power purchase agreement”. They include in here the operations in 
solar, cogenerated or wind electrical plants, as well as in the desalination plants 
and transmission lines; these are low-demanded assets, so they focus their 
efforts on its optimized operation. 
- Industrial production. They group here businesses with a very high technological 
component, such as biofuels of the development of solar technologies. In this 
category, the company is leading the geographical markets in which it operates. 
 
According to the Articles of Association, the aforementioned activities and other 
complementary ones might be executed within the national territory (Spain) or abroad, 
either through the parent company itself or through participations in subsidiaries. Many 
of the contracts related to these activities have a duration longer than a year. 
As in the two previous cases, we see that in most years analyzed up to 90% or more 
of the company assets correspond to long-term investments in associated companies, 
more concretely loans. This means the business of Abengoa SA itself are not 
engineering of construction activities themselves, but financing the companies of the 
group dedicated to those activities. Once again, we can take the company as 
representative of the activity of the group, because of subsidiaries do well, the parent 
company will have good results. Strictly talking, Abengoa SA is not the parent company 
of the group (it is Inversión Corporativa IC, SA), but it is the one that reached the pre-
state of insolvency and the most representative of the Abengoa Group. 
Once more the author wants to emphasize that the analysis of the holding companies 
as representative of their groups entails a series of considerations because these 
companies do not carry out significant commercial activity on their own, but rather they 
act as equity holders and financing entities. Thus, if subsidiaries do well in their 




















































FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANIES 
 
3.1 ABENGOA, S.A. 
Assessment of the reliability of the information 
According to the Audit Reports for the period 2011-2015 issued by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Auditores, SL. and Deloitte SL. the annual accounts present 
fairly, in all material respects, the equity and financial position of Abengoa, S.A. at 31 
December of each of those years, its financial performance and its cash flows for the 
year then ended in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework and, in 
particular, with the accounting principles and criteria set forth therein. Nonetheless, the 
author must mention that these Audit Reports included in 2011 and 2015 a “matters of 
emphasis” paragraph, mentioning in 2011 that the company issued separately the 
Consolidated Annual Accounts and that they were audited by the same firm with the 
same opinion. In 2015, this paragraph called to attention to the points 2 and 5 of the 
Notes to the Annual Accounts, in which the events occurred in the second semester of 
2015 that led the society to the pre-state of insolvency were expressed. Additionally, 
they stress the uncertainty regarding the company continuing with its operations as 
usual. 
Therefore, the information should be considered as reliable. However, the analyst 
could consider the possibility of making some adjustments. In this case, due to the 
nature of the society at hand we opted for making adjustments in operating assets, and 
including in this category all the financial investments in subsidiaries and associated 
companies, both in the long and the short term. Additionally, we will include financial 
revenues coming from holdings in subsidiaries in the net turnover figure. This is a 
notable change since usually only holdings in equity of subsidiaries are included in 
operating assets, plus some financial results usually belong to the financial result and 
not to the net turnover. 
 
Main risks and uncertainties 
According to the Notes to the Annual Accounts of the society along the period 
considered, the main sources of risk Abengoa faces are: 
 Market risk: which involves the variation in the exchange rates of foreign 
currencies as well as in interest rates. The society uses several derivative 
instruments in order to hedge from these. 
 Credit risk: refers to the possibility of non-repayment of the financial 
investments the company has, above all in its subsidiaries. In this regard, the 
company has a firm commitment from a top-tier financial institution for the 
factoring without recourse of these investments in case it is needed. 
 Liquidity risk: is related to the need of the company to have the necessary 
monetary resources to face its financial obligations on time. The company 
keeps in mind the maintenance of a proper level of financial leverage and 
analyzes carefully the cash flow previsions (there is a special mention to this 
risk in the Notes of 2015, this will be explained in detail in section 3.1.4) 




 Equity risk: linked to the necessity of guaranteeing the continuity of the 
subsidiaries as well as offering the maximum profitability for all the 




Figure 3.1: Balance Sheet structure of Abengoa. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
Assets 
We can observe a very aggressive upward trend in total assets, growing in the double 
digit figures from 2011 to 2014. In 2015 it slows down a bit, but the increase is still a 
remarkable 7% from the last year. In an aggregated fashion, in the period analyzed 
total assets went from €8.142b to €12.432b, a stellar increase of 52.7% in a five-year 
period. Non-current assets can be highlighted as the main heading, with a vertical 
percentage of 74% in 2011, increasing up to 90% in 2012 and being virtually the 
enterity of the assets base in 2014 and 2015. Long-term investments in associated 
companies, in the form of loans, are the main long-term asset the parent company 
holds. With regard to current assets, they go from a vertical percentage of 24% in 2011 
to virtually disappearing in the last 2 years considered, and have an importance around 
the 10% in 2012 and 2013. Assets within this category are mainly cash and cash 
equivalents. 
Financial Structure 
Equity fluctuates around 10%, being a little bit lower (8-9%) in the first two years of the 
period and a little bit higher (13%) in the second half (2013-2014). It drops to 5% in the 
last year considered. Most of this equity is in the form of share premium and reserves 
and it is remarkable the big chunk of losses affecting total equity in 2015 (-9%). In 
absolute terms, it stays within the high €0.6-0.75b, only surpassing that level in 2013 
and 2014, when it scales up to €1.4-1.5b. 
Non-current liabilities start really high (more than 80%) and tend to moderate as 
time goes by (down to 74% in 2015). These liabilities materialize in the form of long-
term debt payable both to third parties and to subsidiaries and associated companies. 
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In absolute terms, they amount for €6.6b up to €9.2b of debt (in the last year it 
corresponds almost completely with debt payable to associated companies). This long-
term sindicated debt is used to general financing needs of Abengoa and enterprises of 
the group, according to its Annual Accounts.  
With respect to current liabilities, they start at the 10% level, dropping to 5% next 
year to initiate an increasing trend during the last three years of the period, to account 
for 9, 15 and 20% of the total financial structure in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
In the Annual Accounts of the society there is no explanation for this proportional 
increase in short-term debt. These liabilities correspond to short-term debt payable 
both to third parties and subsidiaries (mainly to the former) used to deal with any short-
term shortage of the parent company or any other company of the group. In absolute 
figures they add up to 0.8b in the beginning, down to 0.46b and from there increasing 
to €0.97b, €1.8b and €2.5b in the last three years. 
Income statement 
 
Figure 3.2: Income Statement structure of Abengoa (103€) 
Source: compiled by the author. 
Net turnover increases more or less linearly until 2014, when it reaches a value of 
€1.175b, and then drops in 2015 down to €1.16b. This figure results mainly from long-
term financial investments in the group financing and dividends form equity holdings, 
as this sources should be included in the net turnover figure because of the company 
being a holding society. Operating income accounts for 90% or more of the net 
turnover in the first 4 years of the period (this is operating margin is 90% or more in the 
indicated period), with personnel expenses and other operating expenses (outside 
services) being the only remarks here, except in the last one when big losses of €0.32b 
become prominent due to severe losses from disposal of non-current assets from 
holding subsidiaries. These losses are the result of the application of the going-concern 
principle, due to the fact that at the end of November 2015 the society presented its 
pre-state of insolvency (we will treat this more in depth in a subsequent section). 
In the financial income part is where most of the company expenses are located. 
Interest expense coming from the huge debt we have already considered in the 
previous section represent costs of almost 80% and reaching 89% of the net turnover 
in the last year considered. This makes the financial result just as negative, with the 
exception of some positive changes in the fair value of financial instruments in 2013. 
To have an idea, financial expenses in absolute terms by years are: €0.48, 0.6, 0.74, 
0.87, 0.87b respectively. This is a lot of money in interest expenses due to the high 
level of debt the company incurred. 




Finally, income for the year follows a similar trend to operating income but lower, 
due to financial expenses. Profit margin grows from 11% to 20% in 2013 and 17% in 
2014, to drop aggressively down to -108% (losses of €1.062b) of net turnover in the 
last year, due to the aforementioned impairments. 
Cash flow statement 
 
Figure 3.3: Cash flow statement of Abengoa. 
Source: compiled by the author. 
As we can appreciate from the graph, Abengoa is able to generate a positive CFO in all 
years considered. More specifically, the amount increases from 2011 (€140m) until 
2014 (€320m), to finally drop in 2015 to the level of €200m. It follows a very similar 
trend to net income, but without the huge drop in the end (we must remember it was 
caused by impairment losses and thus it is not reflected or better said it is adjusted in 
the CFO). FFO are much greater than net income, especially due to adjustments 
regarding interest expense, being other income somehow relevant in 2012, 2013 and 
2014. CFO in the strict sense differs a bit from FFO due to some adjustments in 
payables and receivables, but these are not very significant. Finally, in the section of 
other CF from operating activities, there is a big negative cash flow due to the payment 
of interests, which is partially compensated by the receipt of dividends, leaving the 
general picture of the CFO as we mentioned in the beginning. 
The reader should note that what is called here FFO (funds from operations) is 
simply the result of 1. Income before taxes + 2. Adjustments to income. In the same 
way, CFO in the strict sense is FFO + 3. Changes in operating current assets and 
liabilities. Finally, CFO is CFO in the strict sense + 4. Other cash flows from operating 
activities (all these formulae is present in the enclosed CD). 
CFI is the main negative flow, since the main function of the company is financing its 
subsidiaries and this require a lot of money invested in financial assets. In 2011 these 
expenditures raised up to €1.77b, next year they increase by 18% up to €2.1b to drop 
to €1.1b in 2013, with no special mention for it in the company Annual Accounts. It 
comes back to normal levels in 2014 and 2015 with €2.27b, €2.075b respectively. Cash 
receipts from disinvestments are virtually null, expect in 2013, when the company 
receives almost €150m from other financial assets (again no particular reference to it in 
the notes to the financial statements) 
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To sustain this level of outflow from huge financial investments, the company needs 
to be “feed” by a good financing inflow. In this case, the tendency shows ups and 
downs and CFF sums up €1.64b in 2011, €0.46b next year, increases again to €1.35b, 
then decreases back to €1.1b to finally reach the biggest value in 2015, with €1.75b. 
 The financing sources are in one hand the issue of new equity instruments (just in 
2011, 2013 and 2015), with an approximated value of €300m, €516m and €175m 
respectively (in 2013 it stated that it is used to help to repay some loans with third 
parties and in 2015 they state that it was partly made to meet their obligations 
regarding some instruments such as warrants and convertible bonds) and the disposal 
of own equity instruments, which is around the €90-100m level every year except in 
2014, when it reaches €576m. Also in the equity instruments side, the society acquires 
its own equity instruments, which supposes an outflow, from 2011-2014 (€144m, 
€102m, €180m, and spikes to €576m respectively). 
On the other hand, the second source of financing is the issue of debt instruments. 
More specifically, long-term debt payable to subsidiaries and associated companies, 
which is issued on every year of the analysis, at different levels: in 2011 adds up to 
€1.68b, then the level goes down to €0.45b, and from there it increases to €1.17b in 
2013, to reach finally the €2.33b and €2.025b level in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The 
issue of debentures in 2013 (€0.416b), 2014 (€0.27b) and 2015 (€0.717b) is 
remarkable too and in the last year of the period we find a big chunk (€1.8b) coming 
from long-term debt payable to credit institutions. This issuing is counteracted by the 
refund and amortization of long term debt (every year except in 2012) and debentures 
and negotiable securities (just in 2013 and 2015, reaching a level of €0.1b €1.8b; this 
might explain the issue of corporate debt in the last year analyzed). The amount paid to 
credit institutions is €0.3b in 2011, none in 2012 and €0.5b in 2013; from there it jumps 
to €1.45b and €1.13b in the last 2 years. We must also note that according to the 
notes, the society refinances its debt in 2012 and 2013 with a forward start facility 
(which is a credit facility which commits a syndicate of lenders to refinance an existing 
credit facility upon maturity) and in 2014 with a revolving loan (which is a facility that 
allows the holder the flexibility to repay or ask for more money without a fixed number 
of installments). This suggests the company is facing difficulties when repaying its 
financial obligations during the period. 
Cash payments of dividends are not very significant at first sight, and they follow an 
upward trend from 2011 (€18m) up to €90m in 2015. They increase slowly in 2012, 
2013 and 2014 (€36, 37, 39m). However, if we compare them with CFO, we realize 
they represent around 13% of CFO and are especially significant in 2012 and 2015, 
with a 26% and 44% respectively. So we realize the company pays a lot on 2012 and 
2015 in contrast to what it is able to generate form its operations. 
Taking into account all this, cash and cash equivalents stay virtually the same in 
2011, decrease in €1.5b in 2012 (buffered by more than more than €2b) increase in 
€0.5b in 2013 and decrease in €0.855b and €0.15b in 2014 and 2015. 
As a summary, we could state that the company is having some difficulties with 
cash. The mechanics the company follows is obtaining money form the group 
subsidiaries and huge sindicated loans to distribute that money among the subsidiaries 
which need it. However, we observe Abengoa has to renegotiate debt several times 
because it is unable to face its financial obligations on time. Regarding CFO, it is 
positive and follows an increasing trend, dropping a bit in the last year, but again we 
observe too much dividends are paid in proportion. Additionally, cash and cash 
equivalents decrease aggressively over the years, letting us discern that things are not 
going well for the company. 




3.1.1 Analysis of profitability 
 
PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ROA 6,67% 12,65% 9,41% 6,01% -1,27% 
Profit margin 87,41% 143,28% 101,40% 59,94% -16,01% 
Assets turnover 0,076 0,088 0,093 0,100 0,079 
Operating ROA 9,30% 13,56% 9,59% 6,07% -2,57% 
Operating Profit Margin 89,43% 143,07% 92,70% 59,61% -32,28% 
Operating Assets Turnover 0,104 0,095 0,103 0,102 0,080 
Non-operating ROA -0,58% 0,27% 7,90% 2,14% 394,93% 
ROE 8,44% 31,15% 17,65% 6,94% -155,08% 
ROA 6,67% 12,65% 9,41% 6,01% -1,27% 
FLEV 10,840 10,666 6,727 6,580 17,689 
AIR 6,51% 10,91% 8,19% 5,86% 7,43% 
SPREAD (ROA-AIR) 0,16% 1,73% 1,22% 0,14% -8,70% 
ROA + (FLEV*SPREAD) 8,44% 31,15% 17,65% 6,94% -155,08% 
EBIT 543.119 1.101.021 977.629 704.716 -157.695 
Figure 3.4: Profitability analysis of Abengoa 
Source: compiled by the author 
ROA doubles from 2011 to 2012, and from there decreases, reaching negative values 
in 2015. These negative values are due to the fact that in 2015 the company the 
company register very large impairments for disposal of non-current assets from 
subsidiaries and associated companies (this will be treated in section 3.1.4). The KPI is 
driven by a very strong profit margin, even greater than net turnover due to positive 
recurring financial income in 2013. Assets turnover remain low, due to the massive 
asset base of the company. Operating ROA follows the same trend, and so does ROE, 
but at a larger scale since we are talking about a positive spread except in the last year 
if the period, in which both financial leverage and spread become very large (spread 
becomes very negative due to the drop of ROA) and it sinks down to -155%. This level 
of FLEV manifests a very high risk for the company, since it relies a lot on external debt 
to keep functioning. 
3.1.2 Analysis of liquidity 
We must note that because the company we are analyzing is a holding company, and 
thus it does not have noticeable commercial activity on its own, the author opted for 
skipping the analysis of working capital and the activity ratios, since they do not provide 
useful information in this case. 
 
LIQUIDITY STOCK RATIOS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Current ratio 2.65 1.39 1.14 0.13 0.04 
Quick ratio 2.65 1.39 1.14 0.13 0.04 
Cash ratio 2.63 1.30 1.09 0.11 0.02 
Figure 3.5: Liquidity stock ratios of Abengoa 
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Source: compiled by the author 
Current and quick ratio are the same (no inventories or accruals) and cash ratio is 
minimally lower than the previous two (accounts receivable are not very important). 
The tendency is good in the first three years, being all of them greater than 1 and 
showing the ability of the company to repay its immediate obligations without any 
problems. However, they become really tiny in the last two years considered, as short-
term debt scales up to massive figures, suggesting that the corporation may have 
serious problems when facing its short-term repayments. This reveals a negative WC 
in the last two years, and introduces the risk of non-current assets being financed with 
short-term debt. 
 
LIQUIDITY FLOW MEAUSURES 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
CFO 140.824 137.111 254.912 320.915 201.335 
FFO (income before taxes + adjustments to 
income) 
523.445 601.638 790.084 965.880 868.987 
Cash flow ratio (CFO/current liabilities) 0,18 0,30 0,26 0,18 0,08 
Current financial liabilities /CFO 5,37 3,13 3,48 5,38 12,12 
Current financial liabilities /FFO 1,44 0,71 1,12 1,79 2,81 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO -10,03 -1,24 -0,68 4,82 11,92 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO -2,70 -0,28 -0,22 1,60 2,76 
Figure 3.6: Liquidity flow measures of Abengoa 
Source: compiled by the author 
Although CFO is positive in every period and it grows until 2014 to drop in 2015, 
Abengoa is not able to cover its current financial liabilities with its CFO, meaning it 
might have liquidity problems and the necessity of looking for other financing sources in 
order to collect enough cash to face its financial obligations. What is more, not even 
taking FFO into consideration would the company be able to satisfy these needs 
(except in 2012). If we take NOA into the equation however, the situation looks better, 
but still in the last two years the society will not be able to cover all its financial liabilities 
with the CFO or even FFO it generates. 
To sum up, we can say that everything indicates the company’s ability to pay back 
its debts in the short-term is noticeably decreased in the last two years of the period. 
The corporation relies very much on external debt to carry out its business and this 
debt deteriorates its liquidity stock ratios and makes it very difficult for the company to 
pay back its debt with the cash flow it generates (as the liquidity flow measures 
suggest). 
3.1.3 Analysis of solvency 
 
Solvency stock measures: 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Equity 687.660 746.281 1.343.959 1.547.758 665.210 
Total liabilities 7.454.467 7.959.510 9.040.610 10.184.225 11.766.877 
Total assets / Total liabilities (non-current + current) 1,09 1,09 1,15 1,15 1,06 
Equity / Total liabilities 0,09 0,09 0,15 0,15 0,06 
Solvency flow measures:           
EBIT/Interest expense 1,12 1,27 1,32 1,18 -0,18 
CFO 140.824 137.111 254.912 320.915 201.335 




FFO 523.445 601.638 790.084 965.880 868.987 
CFO / Total liabilities 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,02 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + current) /CFO 52,50 57,60 35,02 31,43 57,89 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + current) /FFO 14,12 13,13 11,30 10,44 13,41 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO 37,10 53,23 30,86 30,86 57,69 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO 9,98 12,13 9,96 10,25 13,37 
Figure 3.7: Solvency analysis of Abengoa 
Source: compiled by the author 
Regarding solvency stock measures, we realize Abengoa relies a lot on external debt 
to finance its business, as remarked by the ratios TA/TL (which is barely higher than 1) 
and E/TL (which stays around 10-15%, being 6% in 2015). This implies the company is 
at risk of having solvency problems. This situation is confirmed by the ratio EBIT/IE, 
which is low and close to 1, which means almost all the recurring earnings are used to 
pay interest expense from the huge debt the company is incurring. Total financial 
liabilities represent up to 57 times CFO and 14 times FFO in some years, this fact gives 
us some perspective of the size of the debt. Of course we must consider these data 
with caution since in this case the company has other means to raise cash in order to 
meet its financial obligations. 
All in all, we can say that Abengoa is a profitable company, at least in the first four 
years of analysis, however, some problems that we will consider next provoked by its 
excessive reliance in debt, has caused the results to drop in 2015. If we consider 
liquidity and solvency, we realize the company is going to have problems to pay back 
the huge debt it has incurred in, both in the short and the long term, because it has not 
the ability to generate enough cash flows to cover all these obligations properly. 
 
3.1.4 The root of Abengoa fall 
We have realized in the section dedicated to profitability that the business of Abengoa 
is profitable and it yields generous returns to investors (in this case we are talking 
about the head of the group, which has no real commercial activity itself but its 
business is financing the rest of the companies of the group, but results of this are quite 
good, at least in the first four years considered). Why is that in 2015 the company 
registers more than €1b in losses? We will try to go through the fall of the giant and 
understand why the multinational went from being one of the biggest Spanish 
companies to being in a critical situation.  
To explain these apparently sudden but huge losses, we must pay attention to the 
section 2.1.1 of the Notes of the company in its 2015 annual accounts. There they 
explain that the reason for these impairments was initiated in the second semester of 
2015, when the company decreased its previsions of cash flow from operations, due to 
extra capex investments in its subsidiaries that had to be financed with money from the 
parent, given the big amount of capital necessary to run their businesses. This fact 
increased the uncertainty of the markets and led Abengoa to a difficult situation 
renewing its long-term debt and equity instruments, as well as short-term debt, putting 
at risk the liquidity of the group. During September 2015, the company announced a 
renegotiation of the agreement with several financial institutions as well as a new 
strategic plan whose core points where the reduction of debt reliance of the companies 
of the group, setting limits to capex investments and the disinvestment in non-current 
assets. In November, the company presented a pre-agreement with Gonvarri 
Corporación Financiera, a company willing to invest in Abengoa, which was going 
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through an uncertain situation. However, at the end of the month the preliminary 
agreement broke and the society considered a re-financing process with its current 
creditors. In this situation, the Board of Directors thought that the most suitable action 
was to present in the Commercial Court number 2 of Sevilla the pre-state of insolvency. 
Regarding the refinancing process that we mentioned previously, on the 25th of 
January 2016, the society informed that it had been presented to the Board of Directors 
a Viability Plan (updated in August of the same year) that expresses the bases of 
negotiation with its creditors and the activities the society will be carrying out in the 
future, related to engineering and construction and making big disinvestments in non-
core assets in order to improve the situation. The main points of the abovementioned 
document are the refinancing of some debt and the injection of a lot of new capital to 
the society, in exchange for the 95% of the equity for creditors, meaning current 
owners would be left with just 5% of the actual value. 
This adverse situation motivated the registration of impairment for disposal of non-
current assets that we have already analyzed, following the ongoing principle. On the 
17th of January 2017, the company announced that the final support for the new 
agreement represented 94% of the creditors, and is working on the implementation of 
the new measures. (Abengoa, 2017)  
3.1.5 Abengoa, overall opinion 
The company has tried to grow too much in a too short period of time, incurring in an 
unaffordable debt to sustain its capital-intensive business model. From the analysis of 
the balance sheet, we can deduce the spectacular growth of almost 53% in the asset 
base in the period was supported in a huge debt reliance, being equity a really small 
part of the financial structure and shifting towards short-term debt as the time went by.  
Company “operations” (at least the operations of its subsidiaries) are very profitable, 
but big financial expenses and too much risk in its approach has led the company to 
the pre-state of insolvency, as we have already mentioned. The company has issued 
too much debt to sustain the level of payments its high-tech solutions require, and this 
worsened its liquidity indicators, such as those related with CFO, in which we could 
observe that short-term (financial) liabilities were several times higher than the ability of 
the company to generate cash flows. In the long term the tendency was similar, being 
EBIT just above interest expense throughout the period, and having an insufficient 
TA/TL ratio. The main fault of Abengoa has been maybe rushing too much and not 
growing properly, it introduced a very big risk with its strategy and now is paying the 
price of it. 
What future holds for Abengoa seems to be a very deep restructuring process, a 
terrible hangover after the party of uncontrolled and certainly irresponsible growth. In 
the conclusions we will give an opinion on what the future of the company may look like 











3.2 ACCIONA, S.A. 
Assessment of the reliability of the information 
According to the Audit Reports for the period 2011-2015 issued by Deloitte SL. the 
annual accounts present fairly, in all material respects, the equity and financial position 
of Acciona, S.A. at 31 December of each of those years, its financial performance and 
its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with the applicable financial 
reporting framework and, in particular, with the accounting principles and criteria set 
forth therein. Nonetheless, the author must mention that these Audit Reports included 
in 2011, 2012 and 2013 a “matters of emphasis” paragraph, mentioning in every year 
that the company issued separately the Consolidated Annual Accounts and that they 
were audited by the same firm with the same opinion. Additionally, this paragraph in 
2013 calls the attention to the section 8.2 of the Notes to the Annual Accounts, in which 
the impairments of certain investments in subsidiaries due to the new legal scene in the 
industry are explained. 
Therefore, the information should be considered as reliable. However, the analyst 
could consider the possibility of making some adjustments. In this case, due to the 
nature of the society at hand, we opted for making adjustments in operating assets, 
and including in this category the investments in subsidiaries and associated 
companies, both in the long and the short term. Additionally, we will include financial 
revenues coming from holdings in subsidiaries in the net turnover figure in the first 
three years, as in the Annual Accounts these are included in the financial part of the 
income statement. This is a notable change since usually only holdings in equity of 
subsidiaries are included in operating assets, plus some financial results usually belong 
to the financial result and not to the net turnover. 
 
Main risks and uncertainties 
According to the management report of the society along the period considered, the 
main risks the group face can be divided in several typologies: 
 Economic-financial risks: exchange rates, interest rates, price of raw 
materials, liquidity and related are reduced by hedging operations using 
derivatives. Credit risk is reduced using criteria generally accepted by the 
markets (ratings, historic relationship, etc.) 
 Strategic risks: which are reduced by the careful study of every step of the 
strategy Acciona carries out, with thorough studies of different aspects of the 
business and the diversification of this. 
 Operations risk: mainly related with the suppliers of the group, which are 
reduced by the analysis and determination of critical suppliers and business 
points. 
 Fortuitous risks: regarding environment and labor risks. Again the company 
has systems to minimize these, setting in preventive measures. 
 
 





Figure 3.8: Financial structure of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Assets 
Total assets fluctuate over the period considered, reaching a maximum of €6.1b in 
2012, then dropping to €4.99b in 2013 to recover a bit in the last two years. In spite of 
these ups and downs, the asset base is always between €5b and €6b. The composition 
of them begin being almost 50-50, but non-current assets (composed basically by long-
term investments in subsidiaries in the form of holdings in equity, because this is the 
parent company) drop from 49% in 2011 to the 40% level in 2015. There are some 
deferred tax assets but hey have minor importance. Current assets follow the opposite 
trend and the start at the 50% level to reach a weight of 60% in the last year of the 




If we analyze the financial structure, we realize equity follows a decreasing trend, from 
73% down to 56% in 2013 and 60% in 2015, and its composed mainly by reserves. On 
the other hand, total liabilities act the opposite way, more specifically, non-current go 
from 14% to 19% (provisions and long-term debt payable to third parties) and current 
start at 14% and go up to 21% of the total financial structure (being in this case short-
















Figure 3.9: Income Statement structure of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
When looking at the income statement of the society, we must bear in mind that the 
company does not have a significant commercial activity on its own, and its main 
purpose is acting as a holding society and participating in different subsidiaries of the 
group. This contrasts with Abengoa, which main assets were loans to companies, and 
its revenues were interest. In this case, the companies holds equity as a long-term 
investment and will receive dividends, as well as interests for its short-term loans.  
Because of the condition already mentioned, net turnover in the first three years of 
analysis has been modified to show the real picture, and the real situation is a net 
turnover goes from €0.56b in the first year to €233m in 2013  to go up again in the last 
two years of analysis to €325m and €246m respectively in 2014 and 2015. Personnel 
expenses and outside services are the main expenses, ranging in the mid €30m level 
in the first case and the €50-60m in the case of the latter.  
In the financial part of income, revenues from financial instruments are the most 
important line, but these have been modified and included in the net turnover figure 
because of the adjustments in operating assets. Financial expenses are controlled and 
do not exceed €68m, which is the maximum figure reached in 2014. Impairment for 
disposal of financial instruments is a big source of losses, especially in 2011 (€277m 
because of the impairment of some of its shares in other companies of the group) and 
above all in 2013 (€1.16b due to some legal changes in the scope of activity of the 
corporation that motivated the impairment in some of its shares in other enterprises of 
the group, however, this is non-recurring). Financial income is then negative throughout 
the period considered and special attention must be payed to years 2011 and 2013 
because of these impairments (close to -€0.3b and -€1.2b) 
Income for the year follows a similar patter to operating income, having a deep 
valley in 2013 and being moderately positive in the surrounding years, more in the 
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Cash flow statement 
 
Figure 3.10: Cash flow statement of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
Acciona is able to generate positive CFO over the years, although the tendency is to 
decrease and there is an exception in 2013 with a negative result. Income is positive 
throughout the period considered and the effect of the big impairment in 2013 is 
corrected by the adjustments to income, so we cannot say negative CFO in that year is 
because of that. FFO start being negative in the level of negative €40-45m and then 
becomes positive up to €90m in 2014 and €57m in the last year of the period (remind 
that FFO is 1. Income before taxes + 2. Adjustments to income). These changes are 
mostly because of financial revenues and expenses and adjustments for impairments. 
Changes in operating current assets and liabilities are not very significant, and they 
reach a peak in 2012 with a positive value of €104m. Considering all this, CF in the 
strict sense (FFO + 3. Changes in operating assets and liabilities) is positive and 
ascending except in 2013m, with -€23m. Other cash flows from operating activities, 
coming from interests and dividends, leave the scene with a fairly positive CFO in the 
first two years, followed by a small drop in 2013 (provoked by a decrease in income as 
can be appreciated in FFO being lower than the previous year) to regain in 2014 and 
2015 (approximately €380, 260, -32, 152 and 156m respectively). 
Cash payments for investments are important in 2012 (€400m in Acciona Energía 
for licenses), 2014 (€0.76b, above all in the energetic part of the group) and 
2015(€0.37b in energy and infrastructures). Disinvestments are not very important 
(~€90m except in 2013, with €38m), but in 2015 we find a big amount of €0.48b. All this 
cash comes from and is paid to the subsidiaries the company has participation in. 
These movements provoke ups and downs in the CFI, being €77m, -€307m, €31m, -
€0.66b and €107m from 2011 to 2015, respectively. 
Regarding CFF, the only important movement associated with equity is the 
acquisition of own equity instruments in 2012 for €122m. In the case of debt 
instruments, in 2012 we find the issue of €0.25b of other debt and in 2013, 2014 and 
2015, between debentures and negotiable securities and long-term debt to credit 
institutions we have €0.36, 1.1 (mainly debentures and negotiable securities) and 0.34b 
respectively, being the refunds €0.2, 0.57, 0.507b during the last three years. Payment 
of other equity instruments (dividends and others) are moderately important (€0.2b in 
2011, €0.19b in 2012, €0.15b in 2013 and €0.11b in 2015). This makes CFF negative 
(especially in 2011 and 2015, with -€0.375b and -€0.263b) except in 2014 with a 
positive result of €0.531b. As we can observe from this statement, the company does 




not finance its activities with debt payable to credit institutions as much as it does with 
equity instruments, and this policy maintains a healthy financial structure as we will 
analyze next. This is because in general, financing operations in this way is cheaper 
and requires less supervision of the enterprise from third parties, which is an 
advantage if the business is big enough to do it. Nonetheless, there are no external 
ratings of Acciona corporate debt, as the company did not asked for it to any rating 
agency. 
Taking everything into account, net increase / decrease of cash and equivalents is 
insignificant except in 2011 (€80m) and 2012 (-€120m). This decrease in buffered with 
the cash collected in the previous year and some more the company had from prior 
operations. The cash base the company maintains is very close to zero the rest of the 
years of the analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Analysis of profitability 
 
PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ROA 8,25% 3,66% 2,85% 4,24% 2,61% 
Profit margin 101,31% 105,18% 129,40% 71,51% 55,78% 
Assets turnover 0,081 0,035 0,022 0,059 0,047 
Operating ROA 6,68% 2,02% 0,40% 4,23% 2,61% 
Operating Profit Margin 81,95% 58,02% 18,32% 71,36% 55,82% 
Operating Assets Turnover 0,086 0,036 0,023 0,061 0,049 
Non-operating ROA 1,58% 1,64% 2,45% 0,01% 0,00% 
ROE 10,74% 4,61% 3,62% 5,37% 2,67% 
ROA 8,25% 3,66% 2,85% 4,24% 2,61% 
FLEV 0,376 0,485 0,728 0,789 0,674 
AIR 1,65% 1,68% 1,80% 2,81% 2,52% 
SPREAD (ROA-AIR) 6,60% 1,97% 1,05% 1,43% 0,09% 
ROA + (FLEV*SPREAD) 13,22% 5,57% 4,39% 6,50% 2,73% 
EBIT 482.371 223.579 142.421 232.479 137.372 
Figure 3.11: Profitability analysis of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
ROA begins high in 2011 but halves in 2012 and during the rest of the years it stays 
within the 2-4% range. We must bear in mind that ROA is not affected by the big 
impairments in 2011 and 2013 because these are considered non-recurring income. 
Also, profit margin in the first three years is greater than 100% because of positive 
recurring financial income. Assets turnover is very low, due to the huge asset base of 
the company, typical within this kind of businesses. 
If we put our attention in operating ROA we realize how profitable the core activity of 
the company is, taking out the influence of financial income, and we see lower results 
in the first three years as expected. Operating margin is more realistic and we 
appreciate the remarkable difference in the first three years. 
As we saw when analyzing the balance sheet, equity is always larger than total 
liabilities, meaning FLEV will always be less than one, so we do not really expect ROE 
to be very maximized in this case. AIR is low, just increasing a bit in the last two years, 
and spread remains low too, except in 2011 when the highest ROA and lowest AIR 
come together. This makes ROE to act very similarly to ROA and not very far away 
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from it. Overall, Acciona seems to have a nice profitability with a very controlled 
dependence on external debt. 
 
3.2.2 Analysis of liquidity 
Because the society does not have significant commercial activity itself, the author has 
skipped the analysis of WC and the activity ratios because they would not lead to 
useful conclusions. We must note that although the company has a medium level of 
trade account receivables and other receivables, most of them consist on assets for 
current tax, not being the other part representative. 
 
LIQUIDITY STOCK RATIOS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Current ratio 3,74 2,98 2,65 2,69 2,91 
Quick ratio 3,74 2,98 2,65 2,69 2,82 
Cash ratio 3,62 2,86 2,52 2,59 2,74 
Figure 3.12: Liquidity stock ratios of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
All the ratios remain very healthy, being especially high in the beginning and then 
dropping a bit but always staying within the 2.7-3 range. We know we have to take 
these figures carefully, but they look pretty well and suggest the company should not 
have many liquidity problems. As a note, we can deduce WC is positive and large 
during the period considered, since current ratio is always above 1. 
 
LIQUIDITY FLOW MEAUSURES 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
CFO 378.572 258.477 -32.279 152.071 156.166 
FFO (income before taxes + adjustments to 
income) 
-46.831 -38.143 -44.006 89.501 57.131 
Cash flow ratio (CFO/current liabilities) 0,47 0,24 -0,03 0,12 0,14 
Current financial liabilities /CFO 2,12 4,20 -33,67 8,14 7,01 
Current financial liabilities /FFO -17,18 -28,48 -24,69 13,84 19,15 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO 1,21 3,26 -27,51 6,73 5,46 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO -9,80 -22,09 -20,18 11,43 14,94 
Figure 3.13: Liquidity flow measures of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
Although the company is able to generate positive CFO every year except in 2013, 
when we compare it with current liabilities we realize they are not enough to repay 
them and Acciona must look for another kind of cash inflow in order to pay back the 
debt it has incurred in. Since FFO is smaller than CFO, when we take it into 
consideration the result is even worse. If consider NOA, the situation does not look 
much better. To defray this, as we saw in the analysis of CFS, the company uses 
equity instruments and does not rely as much on external debt. 
As a conclusion, we can say that although the CFL/CFO ratio tends to worsen over 
time and the company does not generate enough cash flows to repay debt, we must 
bear in mind that the company does not really have commercial activity, and the fact 
that it is able to generate positive CFO and has good levels of indebtedness as shown 
by stock ratios suggests Acciona should not have problems in the short-term. 
 
 




3.2.3. Analysis of solvency 
 
SOLVENCY ANALYSIS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Solvency stock measures:           
Equity 4.247.364 4.119.131 2.889.406 3.064.090 3.144.403 
Total liabilities 1.596.041 1.996.696 2.102.268 2.417.441 2.118.116 
Total assets / Total liabilities (non-
current + current) 
3,66 3,06 2,37 2,27 2,48 
Equity / Total liabilities 2,66 2,06 1,37 1,27 1,48 
Solvency flow measures: 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EBIT/Interest expense 18,27 6,65 3,77 3,42 2,57 
CFO 378.572 258.477 -32.279 152.071 156.166 
FFO -46.831 -38.143 -44.006 89.501 57.131 
CFO / Total liabilities 0,24 0,13 -0,02 0,06 0,07 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + 
current) /CFO 
2,90 5,80 -49,86 13,23 11,68 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + 
current) /FFO 
-23,40 -39,30 -36,58 22,48 31,91 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO 2,03 4,94 -44,38 12,10 10,35 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO -16,39 -33,49 -32,56 20,56 28,30 
Figure 3.14: Solvency analysis of Acciona 
Source: compiled by the author 
Both E/TL and TA/TL look really good, being equity and total assets several times 
larger than TL. However, a bad sign is that they deteriorate over time, suggesting that if 
the tendency continues the company may incur in some kind of problematic situation. 
They must identify the exact reasons behind and prevent that situation from getting 
worse. 
EBIT/IE looks good but again it is deteriorating rapidly over the period, bringing up 
that the company is going towards problems if they do not take actions to correct that. 
Total financial liabilities ratios act in the same way as ratios considering current 
financial liabilities, but worse. Again, the society cannot generate enough cash 
organically to repay their debt, and must obtain it in other ways. Similarly, if we take 
into consideration NOA they would still have problems to pay it back in an extreme 
case. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the liquidity section, the ratios look healthy and the 
company is not really a commercial company, so the CFO should be looked carefully. 
 
3.2.4 Acciona, overall opinion 
We are again in front of a company which main activity is holding equity and making 
financial investments in its subsidiaries, with all the special considerations this implies. 
The size is practically half of Abengoa’s, but the financial structure is much healthier, 
having a reasonable E/TL ratio. Although income comes from subsidiaries dividends 
and interests, this gives us an idea of the progress of the group as a whole, which is 
pretty good except for the impairments in 2013 due to the new legal scenario of the 
industry. The society is able to generate positive CFO most years, CFI fluctuates with 
two years of big investments and CFF looks good in the sense that the company does 
not finance itself to a large extent with debt payable to credit institutions. 
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The society is profitable (although not as much as Abengoa) and the impairments in 
2011 and 2013 do not affect this because they are a punctual situation. In terms of 
liquidity, the maintenance healthy ratios suggest the company should not have 
problems to repay its short-term obligations. Here CFO is not as important as the way 
the company finances itself and its subsidiaries in other ways, for example issuing 
equity instruments. However, for a more accurate conclusion, we should look at the 
industry averages, since a relatively high level of debt is usual. In the solvency side, 
TA/TL and EBIT/IE look very good, leading us to think the company will be able to face 
its long-term obligations. 
With this scene, and if the company follows the same trend, we should expect 
steady and controlled growth, relying more on equity than debt (given the industry 
standards). It seems that Acciona is a profitable and unrisky option for investors, a 
perfect example of a company that shows good results at a steady and secure pace.  
 
3.3 IBERDROLA, S.A. 
Assessment of the reliability of the information 
According to the Audit Reports for the period 2011-2015 issued by Ernst & Young SL. 
the annual accounts present fairly, in all material respects, the equity and financial 
position of Iberdrola, S.A. at 31 December of each of those years, its financial 
performance and its cash flows for the year then ended in accordance with the 
applicable financial reporting framework and, in particular, with the accounting 
principles and criteria set forth therein. 
Therefore, the information should be considered as reliable. However, the analyst 
could consider the possibility of making some adjustments. In this case, due to the 
nature of the society at hand, we opted for making adjustments in operating assets, 
and including in this category the investments in subsidiaries and associated 
companies, both in the long and the short term as well as receivables from 
subsidiaries. Additionally, we will include financial revenues coming from holdings in 
subsidiaries in the net turnover figure in the first year, as in the Annual Accounts these 
are included in the financial part of the income statement. This is a notable change 
since usually only holdings in equity of subsidiaries are included in operating assets, 
plus some financial results usually belong to the financial result and not to the net 
turnover. 
 
Main risks and uncertainties 
According to the management report of the society along the period considered, the 
main risks the group face can be divided in several typologies: 
 Corporate governance risk, related to the compliance of the systems of the 
corporate governance, documented in the corporate statutes and the internal 
politics of the society. 
 Market risks, linked to the variation of market variables such as interest rates, 
price of raw materials and exchange rate. 
 Credit risks, meaning the counterparty does not comply the points of the 
contract 




 Business and operational risks, such as technological and IT risks, related with 
environment and several external events and their economic, reputational and 
legal impact. 
 Political risk, coming from changes in the regulatory or legal scene affecting the 
businesses of the group. 
 Reputational risk, associated with negative variances in the value of the society 
in the case of performing under the expectations of its stakeholders. 
More concretely, the measures the company takes regarding financial risks include 
balancing the level of debt with fixed, variable or mixed interest rate, the hedge 
using derivatives in the case of the exchange rates, the diversification of financial 
sources to diminish liquidity risks and the application of certain criteria when 




Figure 3.15: Financial structure of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
Total assets stay pretty much the same, growing just in 2014 by 7%. In the first two 
years non-current assets represent the 84% of the total asset base, and this proportion 
grows up to 92% in 2013 and to 95% in the last two years of the period. Because this is 
the parent company, almost the enterity of these assets are long-term investments in 
subsidiaries and associated companies, in the form of holdings in equity and a residual 
part of loans to companies. This contrasts with Abengoa, where the situation is just the 
opposite. Current assets, complementary, remain as a 16% in the first two years and 
drop down to 8%, 5% and 5% in the last three years of the period. However, in this 
case there is a remarkable difference with the other two companies, and it is that in this 
case Iberdrola has significant commercial activity itself, as we deduce from the 
revenues and expenses section in the notes the Annual Account along the period. 
These are composed mainly by short-term financial investments (in the form of loan to 
companies), short-term investments in subsidiaries (these are significant and according 
to the Notes to the Annual Accounts are derived from the centralized management of 
liquid assets of the group by the society) and, because of the aforementioned 
condition, trade account receivables from subsidiaries and associated companies. 
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Equity starts being 54% of total assets all the way up to 67% in 2015, and its 
composed by capital, share premium and reserves. Income for the year only is only 
significant in 2012 and 2013 and in the case of prior year’s income we observe that has 
certain importance in the last three years considered. 
Non-current liabilities start at the 35% level and in the last three years stays around 
the 20-22%. These are mostly long-term debt payable to subsidiaries and to a smaller 
extent payable to credit institutions. Current liabilities remain around 10, reaching a 
peak at 14% in 2013. This debt is mainly payable to associated companies but some 
part of it is also payable to credit institutions. As the company is the head of the group, 




Figure 3.16: Income Statement structure of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
Net turnover goes from €1.7b in 2011 to €6.1b in 2012 and from there decreases down 
to €1.58b in the last year analyzed. If we look into the annual accounts of the society, 
we realize we must make an adjustment in the first year to include revenues from 
holding in subsidiaries into the net turnover figure. Namely, revenues from holdings in 
equity represent 30.86%, 73.73%, 73.16%, 41.22% and 31.04% of net turnover in 
every year of the period respectively. Nonetheless, since in this case the society has a 
significant commercial activity itself, we must mention the weight of the gas sales to 
subsidiaries and services rendered along the period considered, being in 2011, 2014 
and 2015 much more important than the revenues from subsidiaries (to put it in relative 
terms we must simply observe the difference between 100% and the aforementioned 
figures). Procurements represent a very big chunk of expenses, concretely the 80% of 
net turnover in the first year and then goes down to around 20% in 2012 and 2013 to 
increase the proportion again in 2014 and 2015 up to 50% and 70% respectively. Other 
operating revenues are quite important in the first year (25% of net turnover) but 
become less significant then (6% in 2012 and 2013 and then 15% and 13% in the last 
two years of the period). Personnel expenses are quite relevant in 2011 and 2014, 
accounting for more than 10% of net turnover and other operating expenses reach 
close to 20% of it in 2011 and 15% and 11% the last two years. Impairment for 
disposals of NCA are 11% in 2014 and other results have a negative value of 14% net 
turnover in 2013 but a positive 11% in 2014. Summarizing this figures, we find that 
operating income spikes in the second year of analysis up to €4.3b, and then 
decreases to €2.84b, €0.95b and €0.4b in the rest of the years.  
Financial revenues are not very important throughout the period, while financial 
expenses reach almost €0.9b in the first two years, and from there they decrease their 




volume to €0.76b, €0.55b and €0.48b. The main part of these come from subsidiaries, 
and in the first two years they sum up around €160m coming from third parties. The 
rest of the lines are not very representative, and global financial income follows a 
stable negative tendency throughout the period, decreasing a bit more in the second 
year of analysis because of the high interest expenses and the less income coming 
from other financial instruments compared to the previous year (-€0.56b, -€0.87b, -
€0.68b, -€0.54b, -€0.45b) 
Finally, income for the year follows a parallel trend to operating income, but a little 
bit below, because of the effect of financial income. In general, the period seems to be 
good since the company manages to give positive results in all the years considered, 
although we should keep an eye in the deteriorating trend of net turnover (produced by 
the decreasing revenues coming from subsidiaries), and ultimately income for the year. 
 
Cash flow statement 
 
Figure 3.17: Cash flow statement of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
CFO follows the same pattern as income for the year, but magnified. This is a good 
sign, since the company is able to collect more money than it is accrued, due to some 
adjustments. Major adjustments occur in financial revenues and expenses (dividends 
from subsidiaries) that are firstly subtracted and then added again in line 4 of the 
format. Depreciation expense is also significant in the first three years. In the 1st year 
both inventory and other current assets adjustment are important with more than €0.5b 
in the case of the former and almost -€0.4b in the case of the latter. In that year, €0.23b 
in accounts receivables were not collected, but in the rest of the year this was a 
positive adjustment, although it decreased over time. We should remark that in 2013 
almost €0.67b of payables were paid, meaning a significant adjustment to income. The 
same happened in 2015, with €0.13b in payables. 
CFI is surprisingly positive or around 0 in the period considered, because although 
there are big payments for investments above all in subsidiaries and other financial 
assets (just in 2011 we find a big payment in the form of shares in the business unit 
line, because of the merger with Iberdrola Renovables), there are also big 
disinvestments in the same areas and thus big collections of money during the period. 
All in all, CFI is almost €7b in 2011, then drops to -€0.5b, and -€34m and then is 
positive again in 2014 and 2015 with €1.78b and €0.69b. 
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Again, it is a bit counterintuitive that CFF is large and negative in all the years 
considered. Regarding equity instruments, only in the first year in this value positive, 
due to a big issue of €1.9b. The rest if the years are increasingly negative, going from -
€0.13b to -€0.85b in 2015. This is due to big payments in acquisitions of own equity 
instruments every year, that are partially counteracted by the disposal of own equity 
instruments, but this last figure is much lower. 
With respect to cash involved in debt instruments, we can say there is a big issuing 
of long-term debt payable both to subsidiaries and credit institutions, being the latter 
much bigger than the former except in the first year (€2.9, 2.5, 3.7, 7.7, 5.6b). On the 
other hand, the refunds and amortization of this kind of debt is even higher, accounting 
for €10.2, 5.2, 5.14, 8.3, 5.2b; always with a bigger proportion from associated 
companies. Dividends and remuneration of other equity demands big payments too, 
being negative and large every year (-€1.74b in 2011, around -€1b in 2012 and 2014, -
€0.86b and finally -€0.3b in 2015). 
All these big payments configure a CFF which is negative every year (although it 
improves), which begins in -€7.27b in 2011 and ends in -€0.76b in the last year of the 
period. Net cash increases and decreases during the period are minimal, and the 
company stays around the 0 level in all the years considered (just ending with €67m 
and €10m in 2012 and 2013). It seems that Iberdrola repays a lot of debt during the 
period, and is able to do that because of the issue of more debt (especially payable to 
subsidiaries), disinvestments in subsidiaries and other financial assets and the positive 
CFO that manages to generate. 
 
3.3.1 Analysis of profitability 
 
PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
ROA 3,23% 9,13% 7,64% 1,91% 0,85% 
Profit margin 65,77% 71,20% 74,68% 45,12% 27,34% 
Assets turnover 0,049 0,128 0,102 0,042 0,031 
Operating ROA 2,70% 9,05% 7,47% 1,90% 0,79% 
Operating Profit Margin 55,11% 70,59% 73,05% 44,80% 25,35% 
Operating Assets Turnover 0,055 0,141 0,107 0,043 0,032 
Non-operating ROA 0,52% 0,08% 0,17% 0,01% 0,06% 
ROE 2,48% 12,04% 9,36% 1,20% -0,13% 
ROA 3,23% 9,13% 7,64% 1,91% 0,85% 
FLEV 0,842 0,662 0,558 0,467 0,499 
AIR 4,11% 4,74% 4,55% 3,43% 2,83% 
SPREAD (ROA-AIR) -0,89% 4,40% 3,08% -1,52% -1,98% 
ROA + (FLEV*SPREAD) 2,48% 12,04% 9,36% 1,20% -0,13% 
EBIT 1.536.744 4.344.966 3.563.912 956.286 432.289 
Figure 3.18: Analysis of profitability of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
Considering the asset base remains more or less constant (just increases by €3b in 
the last two years of the period, but this amount is not very significant), ROA follows the 
same pattern as EBIT: spikes up to 9% in 2012 and from there decreases during the 
whole period down to 0.85% in 2015. Both profit margin and assets turnover do the 
same thing, being the latter very small due to the huge asset base the company owns. 
Profit margin also fluctuates, reaching a maximum level of close to 75% in 2013 and 
deteriorating down to 27% in 2015. Operating ROA represents the most part of ROA, 




which is a good sign, and we find that its non-operating part is also positive, being this 
a sign of good profitability.  
Financial leverage is not very high, decreasing from 0.842 in 2011 to the 0.5 level in 
the last three years. AIR is kept controlled and decreases in the last two years, but 
ROA is not high enough so that the spread is positive every year. In fact, spread 
fluctuates and is negative in 2011 (-2.22%), 2014 and 2015 (-1.52% and -1.98%). This 
fact deteriorates ROE in the years mentioned (reaching even a negative result in 
2015), and improves it in 2012 and 2013. 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of liquidity 
 
ANALISYS OF WC 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Operating WC requirements (OWCR) 2.802.817 3.505.238 3.192.884 1.958.912 2.250.137 
Working capital 2.447.115 2.724.613 -2.664.517 -4.226.798 -2.623.306 
WC surplus / deficit (WC - OWCR ) -355.702 -780.625 -5.857.401 -6.185.710 -4.873.443 
Financial current liabilities = short-term debt 4.165.844 3.887.320 6.252.597 6.313.095 5.009.680 
WC surplus + short-term debt 3.810.142 3.106.695 395.196 127.385 136.237 
Other debt with no explicit cost 0 0 25.979 0 0 
WC surplus/deficit + short-term debt + ODNEC = 
non operating current assets 
3.810.142 3.106.695 421.175 127.385 136.237 
 Figure 3.19: Analysis of liquidity of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
First of all is important to note that in this case the analysis of WC and activity ratios 
makes sense, since the corporation has a significant own commercial activity. The 
society keeps a WC deficit throughout the period that is aggravated in the last three 
years, provoked by the diminishing operating current liabilities (affecting operating WC 
requirements because the company is less able to finance its operations with payables) 
as well as a big decrease in short-term loans to companies (current assets), which 
reduces significantly WC. The company then finances these necessities with short-term 
debt, as we observe in the table, increasing the risk of non-payment in the short-term. 
 
 
LIQUIDITY STOCK RATIOS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Current ratio 1,48 1,56 0,59 0,36 0,49 
Quick ratio 1,47 1,56 0,59 0,35 0,49 
Cash ratio 1,21 1,38 0,50 0,28 0,41 
Figure 3.20: Liquidity stock ratios of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
Analogously, liquidity stock ratios degenerate in the last three years of the period, 
because of the worsening of the relationship NCA/NCL. They are very similar, since the 
company does not have a lot of inventory or receivables. 
 
ACTIVITY RATIOS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Inventory turnover (goods for sale) 50,19 24,32 22,98 10,36 18,53 
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Accounts receivable turnover 1,95 2,01 2,96 4,29 6,71 
Net purchase 1.432.505,00 1.390.311,00 999.917,00 1.076.120,00 1.145.132,00 
Accounts payable turnover 2,19 1,97 2,25 10,29 14,74 
Days inventory held (goods for sale) 7 15 16 35 19 
Days receivables outstanding 185 179 122 84 54 
Days accounts payables outstanding 164 183 160 35 24 
Average length of the operating cycle 28,03 11,23 -22,34 83,61 48,66 
Figure 3.21: Activity ratios of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
Days inventory held in the case of goods for sale lengthen over time, reaching a 
peak in 2014 and shortening again in 2015. This is not a good sign, since implies the 
company takes more time to sell its merchandise. Days receivables outstanding 
decrease throughout the period, meaning the society is able to collect money from its 
customers faster as time goes by. Accounts payable turnover increases dramatically in 
the last two years considered, meaning Iberdrola pays its suppliers very soon 
compared to the three previous years (this makes sense with the analysis of the WC 
above, since this reduces the amount of operating liabilities and thus reduces OWCR). 
All of this makes the average length of the operating cycle to improve in the first three 
years to worsen again in the last two years, reaching the worst results of the whole 
period. This means the company was much more operationally efficient in 2011, 2012 
and 2013, basically because the financing period provided by suppliers was much 
longer (although they were paying suppliers up to 6 months later). This situation implies 
the enterprise pays their suppliers much sooner, which puts more risk in failing its 
financial obligations in the short term. As a note, is interesting to see how the company 
offers much better payment ratios in its Annual Accounts (days accounts payables 
outstanding) since the way of calculating it is different and it uses information 
unavailable for the purpose of this analysis, that is the exact number of days the 
company took to pay its suppliers. 
 
LIQUIDITY FLOW MEAUSURES 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
CFO 244.912 4.301.998 2.623.060 702.564 117.720 
FFO (net income + depreciation 
expense) 
222.338 197.171 126.883 6.248 55.012 
Cash flow ratio (CFO/current liabilities) 0,05 0,89 0,40 0,11 0,02 
Current financial liabilities /CFO 20,75 1,12 2,50 9,41 44,08 
Current financial liabilities /FFO 22,86 24,54 51,72 1058,08 94,33 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO -3,67 -0,08 1,59 8,10 35,76 
(Current financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO -4,04 -1,84 32,80 911,00 76,52 
 
Figure 3.22: Liquidity flow measures of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
CFO as we mentioned in a preceding section, goes up until 2012 and from there 
deflates until the last year analyzed. FFO acts differently, going down from the first year 
considered to the fourth and from there climbing a bit again in the last year. The more 
important thing in this table is that current financial liabilities are much larger than CFO 
(maybe they are a bit more balanced in 2012, 2013), but in general the company does 
not generate enough CFO to repay its short-term financial obligations and must obtain 
cash in another way. However, for being this the parent company, we should be aware 
of the limitations of this method to estimate the ability of the company to repay its debt, 




because as we considered in the CFS, it has other ways to raise cash to pay debt 
back. If we take into account NOA, the situation would improve but again, not even 
using these assets to repay the debt would we be able to cancel it in the last two years, 
being the obligations several times higher than the capacity of the company to 
generate cash. 
Considering all this information, although the company is the head of the group, we 
should make a remark in the ability of the company to repay the financial obligations it 
has incurred in, because there is a pronounced WC deficit in the last three years of the 
period, plus liquidity stock and activity ratios deteriorate in the last three and above all 
last two years considered. Moreover, the company is not able to generate cash 
organically to repay its short-term debt, so that is another point to bear in mind. 
 
3.3.3 Analysis of solvency 
 
SOLVENCY ANALYSIS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Solvency stock measures:           
Equity 25.856.591 28.630.007 29.966.805 34.134.732 33.787.273 
Total liabilities 5.082.192 4.839.067 6.562.988 6.610.854 5.189.369 
Total assets / Total liabilities (non-
current + current) 
2,19 2,51 2,79 3,14 3,00 
Equity / Total liabilities 1,19 1,51 1,79 2,14 2,00 
Solvency flow measures: 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EBIT/Interest expense 1,72 4,84 4,69 1,75 0,91 
CFO 244.912 4.301.998 2.623.060 702.564 117.720 
FFO 222.338 197.171 126.883 6.248 55.012 
CFO / Total liabilities 0,05 0,89 0,40 0,11 0,02 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + 
current) /CFO 78,78 3,82 5,61 19,92 128,62 
Total financial liabilities (non-current + 
current) /FFO 86,78 83,31 116,05 2240,29 275,24 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /CFO 58,10 2,83 4,82 19,04 121,83 
(Total financial liabilities - NOA) /FFO 64,00 61,75 99,58 2140,87 260,70 
 
Figure 3.23: Solvency analysis of Iberdrola 
Source: compiled by the author 
TA/TL ratio is healthy and increases over time from 2.2 to 3 and more importantly, E/TL 
ratio also goes from 1.2 to 2, which is good because the company relies a lot more of 
equity than liabilities to finance its operations. 
EBIT/IE is 1.7 in the first year, then increases close to 5 in following two to decrease 
again and finish in 0.9 in 2015. This is not a very good sign, except in 2012 and 2013, 
because the business is generating just enough income to pay interests, not even that 
in the last year. CFO/TL seems to be reasonably high just in 2012 and 2013, being 
very small in the rest of the years, evincing the inability of the company to generate a 
good level of cash flows from operations. If we used NOA to repay debt, it would still be 
very superior to the ability of the company to generate cash from its operations. 
Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that this is the parent company and although it 
has a noticeable operating level, it is not its main activity, so these figures could be 
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misleading. In this case, we must wonder how does the company maintain this 
situation over time, and if we look at the cash flow statement we see that the company 
has a negative CFF every year, this means it repays much more debt than it issues, 
and it is able to do that because apart from the CFO it is able to generate over the 
years, we find a surprisingly positive CFI, which is possible thanks to big 
disinvestments that take place during the period considered. All in all, we can think 
CFO ratios both in the short and in the long term may be unsustainable, and this 
probably would be the case of a regular company. However, in this case we know the 
company has other ways to collect cash to meet its obligations, as we have already 
discussed. 
 
3.3.4 Iberdrola, overall opinion 
Iberdrola is the largest of the three companies, being almost 5 times bigger than 
Abengoa and close to 10 times bigger than Acciona. Debt reliance is controlled though 
and equity increases its importance over the years. As expected, NCA account for the 
most part of the total asset base and most financial obligations are due in the long 
term. Income is much bigger, according to the size of the business, and this time the 
company carries out operations apart from acting as the holding society. Cash flows 
are a bit atypical though, since CFI are positive due to a big amount of disinvestments 
in the period and CFF are negative, due to the repayment of the debt. CFO are positive 
but very decreasing throughout the period, which is not alarming but is a factor to bear 
in mind. 
With respect to the business profitability, ROA is positive but it reaches high levels in 
2012 and 2013 while worsening in the last years of the period, following ROE and EBIT 
the same trend (the former not very far from ROA since FLEV is controlled). In regard 
to liquidity we find a remarked drop from the third year on, when there is a bad WC 
deficit, stock and activity ratios worsen (lengthening of the operating cycle) and the 
ratio CFL/CFO indicates than financial liabilities in the short term are greater and 
greater compared to CFO. If look at the solvency analysis, we realize than TA/TL is 
healthy and improving, while EBIT/IE reaches very good levels in 2012 and 2013 but 
worsens fastly as time goes by. It seems that the company in general has two very 
good years, 2012 and 2013, but has some trouble maintaining the effectiveness from 





























































COMPARISON BETWEEN COMPANIES AND INDUSTRY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we are going to analyze the companies at hand in the context of the 
industry. We will pay attention to the size of the companies, their financial structure and 
also their main indicators of profitability, liquidity and solvency. Since we are talking 
about a big industry, namely utilities, we are going to consider companies that carry out 
a variety of activities (production, distribution, commercialization of energy, 
infrastructures, engineering services, etc.) and we have chosen the parent companies 
as representatives of their groups (since usually in these cases we deal we very large 
groups of companies). We must note that in the case of Abengoa SA the company is 
not strictly talking the parent of its group, because in that case we find a company 
(Inversión Corporativa, I C, SA) that is the real parent; however, we chose Abengoa 
because in this case is the most representative and the one which is in pre-state of 
insolvency. In the case of Endesa SA the situation in similar, being Enel SPA the real 
parent, however we do not have information available since the society is registered in 
Italy, and for our purposes Endesa is representative and similar enough to the other 
companies. 
Another interesting point to have in mind is that all these companies are holding 
companies, and act in a similar way to the three we have already analyzed. Some of 
them are registered like that and some other are not, but if we look at their balance 
sheets, we soon realize their main activity is holding equity and / or financing the 
subsidiaries of their respective groups. Nevertheless, is true that some of them do have 
a significant commercial activity on themselves, like is the case of Iberdrola. 
Finally, as it will be remarked in the next sections, in some of the metrics, we have 
found some outliers in the group that are very far away from the average figures and 
might offer a distorted view of the global scene. For these reasons, these have been 
deleted in certain analysis, so the reader can grasp the real picture in a better way.  
The companies, listed by total assets in descending order are: 
 
 Iberdola, Sociedad Anónima 
 Gas Natural SDG SA 
 Endesa SA 
 Acciona SA 
 Sacyr SA  
 Red Eléctrica Corporación SA 
 Abengoa SA 
 Unión Fenosa Gas SA 
 Duro Felguera SA 
 Nexus Energía SA 
 Cide HC Energía SA 
 








Figure 4.1: Net turnover (thousands of €) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on SABI and own calculations 
As we can deduce form the plot, Iberdrola is clearly above the average NT (in 2012 
and 2013 it is several times higher), then Abengoa is obtaining results ranging from the 
half to close to the average and Acciona is really tiny compared to the industry 




Figure 4.2: Total Assets (thousands of €) 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
Again the asset base of Iberdrola is between 4.5 and 5 times higher than the average, 
distancing itself from the rest. Abengoa begins at 70% of the average approximately to 
slowly improve and end up slightly above in 2015. Acciona places itself at half of the 
average more or less for all the years considered.  
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4.3 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMPANIES 
 
Figure 4.3: Financial structure (thousands of €) 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
As with total assets we distinguish Iberdrola as clearly bigger then the other two 
companies and the average of the industry, we now pay attention to the financial 
structure. We see the industry follows approximately a 50-50 split between equity and 
total liabilities. Iberdrola starts more or less like that and as time goes by reduces debt 
reliance to grow equity. Acciona is more conservative and maintains a greater amount 
of equity compared to total liabilities. Finally we can observe that Abengoa practically 






Figure 4.4: EBIT (thousands of €) 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI and own calculations 
Industry average grows the first years until 2014 and then drops remarkably on 2015. 
Iberdrola manages to reach figures that are between 6 and 8 times higher than the 




average in 2012 and 2013, but is at the same level the rest of the years and very below 
it on 2011. Abengoa is able to reach levels that are well above the average (between 
1.5 and 2 times higher) except in 2014 when is at the same level and 2015 when the 
company incurs in losses. Acciona’s EBIT a bit above the average in 2011 but then we 




Figure 4.5: ROA (%) 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI and own calculations 
It seems that ROA in the industry stays within the 6.5%-8.5% range the first three 
years and then increases close to 12% in 2014 to finally drop down to 1.24% in the last 
year. In this case, Iberdrola is above industry average just in 2012-2013 and staying 
positive in 2015, remaining very belowin 2011 and 2014 when the rest of companies 
manage to achieve very good results overall. Acciona  maintains a ROA equal to a half 
of the industry level in the period 2012-2014, to be at the same level in 2011 and a 
remaining positive in 2015. Finally, Abengoa is able to surpass largely industry 
standards in 2012 and 2013, being close to the average in 2011 and being roughly half 
of it in 2014 to become negative in 2015 because of the crisis it suffered. 
FLEV and ROE 
 




Figures 4.6 and 4.7: FLEV and ROE (%) 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI and own calculations 
Surprisingly enough, we realize that the healthy situation of Acciona and Iberdrola 
regarding debt reliance is not usual in the industry by any means. We find values that 
range from 2.5 to 4, which is several times higher than what is presented in these 
companies. We should note, however, that we have taken out of the analysis Cide HC 
Energía for being an outlier and presenting values artificially high. As we could forecast 
when we analyzed the financial structure, the values of Abengoa are several times 
higher than the high themselves values of the industry. 
Now if we consider ROE, we anticipate it must follow more or less the same trend as 
ROA but magnified (depends on the spread). In the first two years it seems the spread 
of the industry was positive but low to medium, since the difference between ROE and 
ROA is positive but not very large .In the last three years however, the difference is 
very remarkable and it suggests the spread was large (positive in 2013-2014 and 
negative in 2015). Iberdrola is below the average ROE except in 2012, Abengoa is at 
the same level or above (except in 2014, and in 2015 it is below in the sense it is much 
more negative than the already negative results of the industry). Acciona is at the same 
level in 2011 and below the rest of the years, although we should notice it maintains a 
positive result in the last year, when the industry crashes in terms of ROE. This is 
provoked by very bad results of several companies, namely Duro Felguera, Sacyr, 
Nexus, Unión Fenosa and of course Abengoa. We must note that although in terms of 
ROA results were negative but not that bad, the high level of financial leverage of the 
industry makes negative results to become exacerbated and there is a very big 


















Figure 4.5: Current Ratio  
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
Iberdrola manages to be above the average (2011, 2012) or at the same level (2013, 
2015), only being below on 2014. Abengoa is far above the industry but crashes 
completely in the last two years of the period. Finally Acciona is able to maintain a very 
good ratio throughout the years considered. It is very remarkable the low current ratio 
the companies in this industry work with, being current liabilities close to twice the 
amount of current assets almost all the years analyzed. We should note, however, that 
because of the fact that we are comparing with the parent companies and these might 
not have commercial activity on their own, this ratio might not be as important or as low 
as we may think at first glance, as these companies will have other ways to finance 
their short-term assets.  
 
CFO and CF Ratio 
 




Figures 4.6 and 4.7: CFO and CFO/CL Ratio 
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
Analyzing CFO, Iberdola manages to be at the same level as the industry in the first 
year, while generating several times the average in 2012 and 2013 and decreasing 
below it on the last two years of the period (we must remind the company receive a lot 
of cash from disinvestments in the period too). Acciona begins higher than the average 
but during the rest of the years is several times lower than the standard of the industry, 
being even negative in 2013 (in this case, apart from operations, Acciona raises cash 
with the issue of debentures and negotiable securities). Abengoa is below the average 
in every year considered, becoming the gap especially significant in 2012, 2013 and 
2014. This is attention-calling, since in spite of being in-debt companies of the industry, 
its cash-generating ability from its operations (in here we include cash coming from its 
investments in subsidiaries) is below the average every year, and that is a problem. 
Considering it spends huge amounts of money every year in investments, the way the 
society has to sustain its investments is to issue more debt.  
If we pay attention to the cash flow ratio, we realize the industry average is in 
general higher than the in the case of the companies considered, meaning they should 
have less problems to repay short-term debt. In all cases the ratios are several times 
lower in the analyzed companies, with some exceptions. In 2011 Acciona is closer to 
average, in 2012 Iberdrola is above and the other two get closer and in 2013 Abengoa 
and Iberdrola report slightly better results than in the rest of the period. 
The author remarks again that because of these companies being the parents of 
their groups, they might have other ways to raise cash and CFO might not be as 
important, but without knowing if they carry out commercial activity on their own (in the 
case of the companies we have not analyzed in depth) we cannot state this accurately. 
Nonetheless, being the parents of their groups they are able to generate in general 
more cash from its operations (whatever they are) than the companies we are treating, 












Solvency Ratio (TA/TL) 
 
Figure 4.8: Solvency Ratio  
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
We appreciate Iberdrola is chasing the industry average and manages to be at the 
same level more or less (slightly below in 2011 a bit above in 2014), Acciona remains a 
bit under the standards except in 2012 when is at the same level and 2011 when 
reaches a remarkably higher level and Abengoa lags behind the whole period, staying 
around the 1 level. This is, in general, the enterprises analyzed might have a greater 
chance of unpaying in the long term. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: CFO/TL Ratio  
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI 
In general terms, the industry is able to cover a larger % of its total liabilities with the 
CFO they generate. Only Iberdrola in 2012 is able to be at the same level than the 
average, during the rest of the years, they all are well below, meaning their CFO 
compared with their total amount of liabilities is smaller than other companies in the 
same industry (we should take this with the cautions mentioned in the previous section 
regarding CFO and CFO/CL). 





Figure 4.10: Interest Coverage Ratio  
Source: compiled by the author based on SABI and own calculations 
Interest coverage ratio within the industry and in the three analyzed companies are 
not comparable. This is due to the huge values that Red Eléctrica Corporación has, 
reaching more than 12.000 and 17.000 in the last two years of the period respectively. 
As these values are not representative of the whole picture, we have taken out that 
company and used the average of the rest. Now we can make more accurate 
comparations: Iberdrola manages to be above the average in 2012, 2013 and 2015, 
Abengoa stays well below during the whole period, and finally Acciona stays above or 
close to the industry levels except in 2014, when it lags a bit behinf. In general, the 
interest coverage ratio of the companies compared to the industry is not bad 
(especially Acciona’s), although it fluctuates a during the years. Nonetheless In the 


























































In this chapter we will try to summarize all the previous analytical work and try to draw 
useful conclusions regarding the companies at hand. We will use information from the 
profitability, liquidity and solvency analysis, as well as the comparison of the companies 
with the industry standards to give a final judgement that may be useful for investors 
interested in these kind of businesses. 
First of all, we must mention we have analyzed a quite special kind of companies: 
the parents of a group. This means we have encountered several difficulties in applying 
the usual financial statement analysis methods since this is thought for companies 
which have own commercial activity. We have made some unusual adjustments in 
order to try to clarify the situation and we have ignored some methods (such as WC 
analysis) because they were not suitable for our purposes. So what is the main activity 
of the companies at hand? Well it is investing in other companies of their group and 
finance their operations, participating of the dividends and interests these investments 
yield. In some cases, as we have seen in Iberdrola, they have some kind of significant 
activity on their own, in this case it was buying gas to third parties and reselling it to the 
subsidiaries. 
In first place we have Abengoa S.A., a company whose main activity is financing the 
activities of its group. These activities require a lot of cash every year as it is seen in 
the CF statement, and since CFO is not enough to satisfy these needs, the company 
has incurred in a huge amount of debt to continue with its growth. This fact introduced 
risk within the society, and the inability to continue with this situation was the root of 
Abengoa collapse. As the corporation relied heavily on external debt, it must present 
regularly its CF previsions to show financial institutions it will be able to pay back its 
obligations. As we have seen during the period analyzed, the company was 
continuingly refinancing its debt with all kind of facilities because it was unable to meet 
the installments at the date due. In September 2015, this situation was no longer 
possible and the company lost the confidence of investors in financial markets and 
institutions, leading this scene to a crisis that made Abengoa unable to continue with its 
operations and present the pre-state of insolvency in January 2016 along with a 
Viability Plan to save the company from bankruptcy. This document was presented to 
investors in February 2016 and focuses on a new Abengoa less cash-dependent and 
more focused on engineering and construction services, disinvesting in non-core 
assets. In January 2017, after a long period of negotiations with all the involved 
creditors, the society announced that 94% of them supported the new plan 
(Abengoa.es, 2017). 
With the creditors owning 95% of the company and the restructuring process 
underway, it seems that the scenario is prone to change in the next few years. We 
have seen Abengoa S.A. is profitable, the problem was the cash-dependence of the 
company, that caused the excessive debt reliance. With the price of Abengoa shares at 
a minimum, it might be a good time for the risky investor to put some money into the 
company. Nobody knows for sure what will happen, but it seems they have learnt from 
their mistakes and the Viability Plan has almost 100% of acceptance among creditors, 
which is a good sign. Additionally, decision-making process will be in new hands, 
because old owners have been left with just 5% of the company. The author expresses 
his optimism about the new situation because of all the aforementioned reasons. 
Secondly we talk about Acciona, which was the smallest of the three companies. In 
this case the society not only finances its subsidiaries with short-term loans but also 




invest in them, holding equity as a long-term asset. The company has a decent 
profitability (although in absolute terms EBIT is much smaller than the industry average 
because of the size restriction) and does not show signs of having problems to repay 
debt neither in the short-term not in the long-term. We must bear in mind in this case 
CFO might be low compared to financial liabilities in some cases but that is not a 
problem really because the company uses debentures and other negotiable securities 
to finance its operations, not incurring in excessive debt with financial institutions such 
as in the case of sindicated loans in Abengoa, and making CFF negative or close to 0 
most years in spite of having two years of big investments in Acciona Energía. If we 
look at recent news from the company, we can see very often the allocation of new 
projects for the company worldwide (El Economista.es, 2017). Moreover, in the last 
year, its shares increased their value from 67.37€ to 73.01, this is 8.37% (Google.com, 
2017) so it means the future of the company if we take into account past and present 
facts looks encouraging. 
Finally we presented Iberdrola, the biggest of the three companies. This time the 
company in spite of being the parent of the group also carried out a significant 
commercial activity itself, it bought gas to external providers and then sold it to its 
subsidiaries. We observe in this case the most important activity of the company is 
investing and financing the group in a centralized way, as well as managing liquid 
assets. This is a very important part of income but gas sales are very relevant to the 
result as well. As in the case of Acciona, Iberdrola has a decent profitability, being 
positive throughout the period at hand and excelling in 2012-2013. In absolute terms, 
its EBIT among the highest of the industry, due to its size. Its operating indicators 
decline in the last three years (WC, length of the operating cycle) but we see solvency 
indicators do quite well and although CFO is much smaller than financial liabilities in 
the short and the long term, if we have a look at the CF statement we see that in fact it 
is repaying a lot of debt because CFF is negative every year, apart from being 
investing in its subsidiaries. To do that it raises money from big disinvestments and the 
actual CFO that is able to generate; this is, the company is able to generate cash in 
other ways rather than its operations to meet its commitments. Taking into 
consideration external sources such as specialized press and news, we realize 
Iberdrola is a very active corporation which invests worldwide and might be interested 
in the purchase of the rest of the equity of Neoenergia, a Brazilian electric company, of 
which already possess some shares. This movement could create an electric giant in 
Brazil and put the society in a very good situation in the Brazilian market, one of the 
biggest and fastest-developing in south America. These comments suggest the future 
of the multinational company, one of the biggest in its industry, may bring good profits 
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